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JOINT STATEMENT

The President and the Chancellor have had a pleasant and fruitful exchange of views on a number of subjects of mutual interest. Secretary of State Herter and German Foreign Minister von Brentano also participated in the conversation.

The talks were completely informal in nature and did not involve negotiations of any type. The participants believe that the exchange of views which occurred has resulted in a further coordination of the positions of the two Governments on a number of common problems.

Among the subjects touched upon in the course of the conversation were the current disarmament discussions in Geneva, East-West relations in general, the problem of Germany including Berlin, and European economic integration.

The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their determination to continue their efforts to achieve the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom. They further agreed that the preservation of the freedom of the people of West Berlin, and their right of self-determination must underlie any future agreement affecting the city.

The Chancellor and the President discussed the general situation with regard to European economic integration. The President reiterated the support of the United States Government for the goals of the European Communities and for a strengthening of Atlantic economic cooperation. In this connection, they discussed the recent trade proposals of the European Economic Commission. They noted that, should proposals along these lines be adopted, the result would be a major contribution to a general lowering of world trade barriers.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 16, 1960

SUBJECT: Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer at the White House March 15, 1960, 10.30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS: The first part of the discussion was carried on between President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer alone, in the presence of interpreters Weber and Lejins. At the point indicated in the memorandum, the following persons joined the principals: Secretary Herter, Undersecretary Dillon and Ambassador Dowling on the US side, Foreign Minister Von Brentano and Ambassador Grewe on the German side.

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hR
(Mrs.) Nora M. Lejins

After the usual hearty greetings, President Eisenhower invited the Chancellor to discuss any questions which he might like to bring up prior to the talks involving a larger group. Chancellor Adenauer thereupon presented to the President a memorandum concerning the intellectual basis of the fight against communism. He indicated that he had discussed similar matters with the President in December and expressed his hope that the President would take the time to read the memorandum and would let him know whether he agrees with its premises. President Eisenhower promised to send him a note concerning the matter but stated that he could say at once that he heartily agreed with the second sentence of the memorandum which stated something to the effect that communism is governed by Marxist-Leninist principles and that the Communist Party rules supreme in

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and Herbert Hoover, Jr. was taking a particular interest in the matter. He had expressed the hope that the Chancellor might find it possible to make his correspondence, or copies thereof, available to the Princeton Library in order to complete the collection. These papers would, of course, be held under the conditions prescribed by the Chancellor himself in case, for instance, he might not wish them to be opened until 25 years after his death or some other specified period. The Chancellor expressed his willingness to cooperate, saying that he received an honorary degree at Princeton the day before, whereupon the President laughingly said that Mr. Adenauer should in that case be all the more willing to cooperate in this project as an alumnus of the institution. The President promised to tell Mr. Hoover that the Chancellor was willing to cooperate and that, if the Chancellor wished, Mr. Hoover might write him a memorandum concerning the history and development of this collection. The Chancellor appeared to be favorably inclined toward receipt of such a memorandum. He then indicated that there were several personal matters which he wanted to bring to the President's attention. First, he wanted the President to know that he had just come from Mr. Dulles' grave, where he had deposited a wreath. Secondly, knowing about the President's interest in photography, he had taken the liberty to bring him one of Leitz' latest products and, thirdly, to strengthen the President in the difficult times ahead, he was sending him some wine, which should not, however, be permitted to freeze. At the same time he admonished the President not to use the wine too sparingly.



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Drafting Officer:
LS:Mrs. Lejins

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Time: March 15, 1960
10:30 a.m.
The White House

SUBJECT: Germany and Berlin; Importance of Propaganda;
German Rearmament; Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Secretary Herter
Under Secretary Dillon
Ambassador Dowling
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister von Brentano
Ambassador Grewe
Mr. Weber (interpreter)



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the Soviet Union. Chancellor Adenauer then stated that the memorandum deals with the intellectual aspects of the struggle with communism and that we must expect this struggle to continue for years to come. The President agreed, saying that he has been emphasizing in his speeches that the aims and objectives of communism cannot be expected to change.

Chancellor Adenauer then spoke about the importance which he attached to the question of disarmament. He stated that he had addressed the Council for Foreign Affairs in New York the day before and had there expressed and emphasized the need for a coordinated disarmament program. He stated that in spite of work of the UN Ten Nations Committee he felt it would be necessary for the leaders of governments assembling in Paris to do everything in their power to achieve progress in disarmament. He was very emphatic in his statement that he felt it was the human duty of the Big-4 leaders to work for effective disarmament in order to free humanity at long last from fear. He then proceeded to inform the President that he was in Berlin in January and had there addressed the parliamentary body, composed of freely elected representatives of the population. He had discussed with them the question of Germany and Berlin. Three weeks ago he had discussed the same questions in the Bundestag and found that, for the first time since 1949, there was complete unanimity on this question between the Government and the Opposition. President Eisenhower interjected that this was a very welcome development and he wished he could say as much at home.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed that this unanimity was a good thing and expressed the hope that it might remain until after the 1961 elections. Naturally

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Following a private talk between the President and the Chancellor, the additional participants joined the group and the President proceeded to explain to them briefly what had been discussed before, stressing the Chancellor's assurance concerning German unity on the question of Berlin, and the President's assurances with regard to the stationing of US troops in Europe and US intentions about Berlin. The President also stated that both he and the Chancellor had agreed that the need for a constructive and workable disarmament program was of paramount importance as a subject for discussion in Paris. He also referred to the paper given him by the Chancellor, which he promised to read and pass on to the State Department.

Next the President stated that Khrushchev goes around the world making a lot of noise about his peace proposals and peace offerings of various kinds, for instance, the peace treaty with Eastern Germany. All of these things the President considers more theoretical than actual, but he feels that the West must do something to counter such propaganda. He knows that Mr. Herter heartily concurs on this point. Moreover, the best way of doing this is to base our argumentation upon the right of self-determination, and we must insist that all our peace negotiations are based on this principle. This, the President feels, will be the most effective weapon against Mr. Khrushchev's program.

The Chancellor stated that this is his opinion too, but the West must do something to publicize all this for all the world to know. The President replied that his trouble is that Congress never wants to give him any money for propaganda.

When Khrushchev was here, the President went on, he had told Khrushchev that the United States was ready to discuss any question, including the question of Germany and Berlin, but that we were willing to do this only on an understanding of our basic position, namely, that we will stand on our rights and that we will make no agreement of any kind that is not acceptable to the people concerned, to wit, the Germans. But we are willing to talk about all questions.

Mr. Adenauer stated that this was a very clear stand and that if it was repeated to Khrushchev often enough, he would finally understand it and accept it.

At a subsequent point in the conversation, the President remarked that, in view of the Chancellor's convictions concerning the importance of propaganda, he wished Mr. Adenauer had a chance to discuss this matter with Congress, since, as the President had indicated before, the Congress was prone not to listen to him when it came to appropriating funds for propaganda. The Chancellor smilingly stated that he would try to do his best in this connection.

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
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during the Embassy dinner which would be attended by many of the Congressional leaders. He referred to the Biblical precept about not hiding one's light under a bushel and stated the West should take this to heart. The President replied that he would welcome a tripling of United States effort in this area.

Mr. Adenauer indicated that Germany has greatly increased its outlay for "propaganda", although the word as such is in disrepute. What it actually amounts to is informing the public and the world at large of German plans and efforts. The President stated that propaganda is a downright wicked word in the United States. Mr. Adenauer stated that the Nazis are to blame for this. He deplored the fact that it was not possible to bring back from heaven a converted Goebbels, and both agreed that this would be a fine thing, provided the fact of the conversion were definitely established.

In a more serious vein, the President then stated that he wished to discuss with the Chancellor something about the military planning concerning Germany. Ever since he went to NATO in January of 1951, all the talks which he had heard about German rearmament had been connected with very stringent upper limits on German armament. The EDC plans had contained not only very tough ceilings but even indications on how German military forces were to be organized.

This was, of course, based on the fear that a militarily powerful Germany might be reborn, which would again take the offensive in Europe. The President wished to know, however, how Germany herself regarded her position and needs, being in the center of Europe as she was, considering what help was available to her from outside, etc. He wanted Mr. Adenauer's own views with respect to a realistic evaluation of the situation. Was Germany happy with what NATO prescribed for her or not?



The Chancellor replied by stating that no one knew better than the President, as a soldier, how difficult it was to build up an army from scratch. It is difficult from an organizational standpoint as well as from the standpoint of procuring sufficient weapons and supplies. In the case of Germany, aside from the question of ceilings, the difficulty has been not so much a question of money, but the problem of getting and training cadres, building barracks, etc. The plans laid down in conjunction with NATO will be fulfilled by 1963. The funds are available now or will be made available at the proper time. As an example of the difficulties involved, the Chancellor pointed out that Germany is making much larger down payments than necessary on supplies ordered in the US in order to keep available funds from being diverted elsewhere. This is a constant struggle.

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the election campaign was bound to bring out and accentuate differences. However, he stated his party had to win in order to continue the line followed by Germany during his administration and which in fact closely followed the policies set up by President Eisenhower himself. Then he the Chancellor proceeded to say that regardless of whether the Summit Conference achieved any immediate success or for that matter any success at all, the fact of this Summit Conference was a monumental historic event and merit, which could not but help improve the world situation ultimately.



President Eisenhower then stated that he had heard that there were several points on which the Chancellor might have some doubts or misgivings, and the President therefore wished to reassure him. From General Norstad and others the President had heard that the Chancellor feared a withdrawal of American troops from Europe. Mr. Eisenhower emphatically assured the Chancellor that there was no intention of doing so until substantial progress had been made in achieving a workable disarmament program. Until that time such a withdrawal would not even be discussed. Secondly, the President wished to assure the Chancellor that the American flag would continue to fly over Berlin as long as present conditions prevailed and no agreement acceptable to the populations of West Berlin and Western Germany had been concluded. The President assured Mr. Adenauer that this is his firm position to which he will adhere as long as he is in office, ~~[and he would like to assure the Chancellor that if, as he hopes, his successor in office will be of the same party, that will also be the policy of his successor.]~~

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As to the President's question on how he feels about the situation, the Chancellor went on, all he could say was that if no effective controlled disarmament program goes into effect in the foreseeable future, Germany will have to redouble her efforts and outlays in this area. A country as exposed as Germany in the heart of Europe cannot afford to sit without doing anything. Whatever that country does or leaves undone is to the good or detriment of the rest of the Free World. But the President need have no fear about Germany. Germany will do the necessary. However, some of the other NATO partners may raise objections. By this the Chancellor did not mean to refer to France. He had asked de Gaulle to inspect some German units, feeling that this would be of great symbolic value, and de Gaulle had readily agreed. Others might however cause trouble. But, if no effective controlled disarmament program went into effect, Germany would be forced to increase its military effort -- with NATO concurrence, of course.

The President expressed pleasure at what the Chancellor had said. He had been concerned about the fact that all military planning with reference to Germany had been calculated on the basis of the fear that a new Hitler Germany might arise and seek to dominate Europe. Since this fear had in the past been nurtured primarily by France, the President was hopeful that this type of reasoning would decline under de Gaulle's leadership.

The President continued by citing some facts and figures for Mr. Adenauer concerning the US 80 billion dollar budget, 56% of which was committed to military purposes alone, primarily for US retaliatory power which was for the protection of the entire Free World, not only for the exposed European front. The money included funds for the Navy, Air Force, the latest heavy bombers, etc. To repeat, all this was intended not only for the protection of Western Europe but for any spot in which the Communists might strike. The President then proceeded to state with some feeling that he felt that the thinking and talking in the West should equal in intensity our political convictions. For instance, he said, if we say that we shall stand firm with reference to Berlin, or a unified Germany, or Turkey perhaps, we must make certain that our military strength conforms to the moral strength of what we are saying. The Chancellor wholeheartedly agreed, adding that the President could rest assured that both out of a sense of duty toward the Free World and for selfish reasons Germany would do whatever is necessary in this respect.

The President said that all this pointed up the need for an enforceable disarmament program.

Mr. Adenauer stated that it was primarily the Laborites who were propagandizing on the fear of German rearmament. Smarting under recent defeats, they are looking for material on which to

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The Chancellor hastened to assure the President that he himself had never doubted the firmness of the US position on these points, but that he had heard doubts and questions on the American side concerning the steadfastness of German public opinion and the intentions and firmness of the German government. Such rumors were completely untrue. Western Germany was firmly resolved in its stand. The Chancellor recalled Mr. Dulles' last trip to Bonn in February 1959, at which time Mr. Dulles had stated that the United States was ready to use force to overcome any obstacles which the GDR might create for the allies in Berlin. At that time Mr. Adenauer had told Mr. Dulles that he fully agreed with this stand and considered it the only correct one. He wished to reiterate this belief to Mr. Eisenhower at this time and wanted the President to know that the German Government was resolved and ready to do everything necessary for the Allies to break opposition with force. Mr. Eisenhower then stated that it appeared that the stand of the two governments in this question was firm and clear. He continued to say that the Chancellor realized, of course, that all types of political thinking were represented in the United States. For this reason it was possible to hear speeches which contained ideas quite different from those expressed by him in the above question. However, these speeches were of no political import. Mr. Adenauer then stated that in his opinion certain circles, probably at the instigation of the USSR, were starting rumors to spread distrust among the Western Allies.

The President said that he would like to discuss one more personal question. Mr. Dulles' papers were being stored at the Princeton Library,

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tangle with the Conservatives, and they have therefore picked on German rearmament. Mr. von Brentano at this point interjected "the British press". The Chancellor agreed and continued to say that he was not referring to the Beaverbrook press -- that was always bad. The London Times was generally more enlightened concerning German matters, but it was now presenting the Laborites' views. He hoped the readers would tire of this approach and the matter would be dropped. Perhaps only patience was required. However, perhaps some effort could be made on the US side to have some political influence exerted on the London Times. Macmillan, he hastened to add, was not to blame in the matter. The bad thing, as far as internal German affairs are concerned, was that the opposition picks up these arguments and makes use thereof for its own purposes.

The President explained that the reason he is so anxious that the Western Powers make the best effort possible to bring our efforts in the area of armament and disarmament into agreement with our political convictions and determination is that he feels we can get disarmament only from a position of strength. We have to pay a price for it. Only if we are strong in arms will Khrushchev understand what the situation is. And the best argument for countering British criticism of German armament is to say: "We are arming in order to make it possible for us to achieve disarmament".

Mr. Adenauer enthusiastically picked up this formulation, repeating, "We arm in order to be able to disarm".

The President ended discussion of this topic by stating that this was a necessity.



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